RESEARCH PAPER

As the Sykes-Picot agreement continues to draw attention and scrutiny, so too do the men who devised it. Many believe that Mark Sykes and Francois-Georges Picot allowed their personal beliefs to taint negotiations and subsequently ruined the chance of sparing the region of turmoil. Therefore, Sykes and Picot have become the paramount examples of Western imperialism and are viewed as the causes of many of the struggles in the Middle East. However, many of the criticisms thrown the way of Sykes and Picot are results of a retrospective point of view. While the decisions to appoint both men are questionable, the results they aimed to achieve were those of their nation not of individuals. When combined with the ineptitude of the regions inhabitants, Sykes’ and Picot’s direct influence in the ensuing drama that is the Middle East is negligible (Garfinkle). Nevertheless, the two men are often blamed by those in the Middle East and scholars of the region for the current discord as a result of their neglectful attitudes and inexperience.
Sykes’ appointment as Picot’s counterpart comes under scrutiny particularly frequently. This is due to his inexperience in the field of negotiations and foreign affairs. However, Sykes was able to deceive, whether intentionally or not, many high ranking officials into believing he was an expert on the Middle East. One of the major modern points of inquiry is how he was able to do this. Sykes served as a Member of Parliament, giving the impression he was adept at political and legislative matters. As a young boy born into a wealthy family, Sykes accompanied his father on trips to the Middle East often. Later in life, after joining the military, he would revisit areas in the region such as Turkey. This gave Sykes what appeared to be an insider’s view and knowledge on the region. A notion he perpetuated by publishing books such as Dar-ul-Islam: A Journey through Ten of the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, and a  number of travel books which focused on the squalor of cities such as Damascus and Mosul and the general ineptitude of Arabs. Through his writings Sykes also “manufactured a reputation for himself as an expert on Islam”. Furthermore, he claimed to “speak Arabic and Turkish fluently but, in reality, spoke neither” (Sengupta). All of these traits were desirable for dissecting the region, which is why Sykes got the job.
However, despite his seeming expertise on the Levant, there were early warning signs his understanding was not as deep as it appeared. During the First World War, a year prior to the Sykes-Picot agreement, Sykes found himself in a position to advise on the region. “Sir Tatton Benvenuto Mark Sykes played a part in one of the greatest disasters of the Great War for the allies, being the first to suggest to Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, that it would be a good idea to land troops in Gallipoli” (Sengupta). Despite the mess that ensued in the Gallipoli campaign, once thoughts of a vanquished Ottoman Empire began to surface, Sykes once again came into focus “looking around for those with the knowledge to help determine what the future of this vast region might be, the eyes of the Minister for War, Lord Kitchener, fastened on young Sykes” (Simon). Sykes’ positions and experience in Parliament, the military, and the reputation he had established for himself as an expert on the Middle East help to “answer the mystifying question of how it was that someone so young was in such a position of influence in the first place” (Simon).
The French counterpart to Sykes was Francois-Georges Picot. Whereas Sykes was an inexperienced newcomer to negotiating, Picot was already a seasoned diplomat and former lawyer. Picot served as secretary to the Ambassador in Copenhagen, and was stationed as far as Beijing. However, it was his time spent in Beirut and later Cairo which gave him the needed knowledge of the Middle East. Furthermore, his membership of the French Colonial Party put him in a position to further Frances interests.  Despite Picot’s role in such a monumentally controversial agreement, little else is known about his activity prior to and after the war. Many view this obscurity as a testament to his regularity and normalcy and his inadequacy to be appointed to negotiate such a deal (“Francois-Georges Picot”).
Nevertheless, debate still rages over whether or not the two men themselves are to blame. The first argument to be made in the innocence of Sykes and Picot is that they were acting on behalf of their government. While the desires of those governments may have been devious, the ideas are not solely those of the negotiators, “for in carrying out the negotiation, they were acting not as principals but as agents, bound by the views of ministers” (Kedourie). In fact, in some instances, Sykes and Picot seem to put the aims of the nation before their individual opinions. “Indeed, in one crucial issue in particular, he held and continued to hold views quite at variance with the arrangements envisaged in the agreement” (Kedourie).
While Sykes and Picot have become the figureheads for the dysfunctional separation of the Ottoman Empire, it is worth noting that they are not entirely at fault, despite the apparently devious deception by Sykes which got him appointed. This sentiment is echoed by Yerevan Saeed, an expert on Near Eastern Policy at the Washington Institute, as he argues that the local populace cannot  “use foreign countries as scapegoats for their own failures” (Saeed). Saeed argues that in order for Sykes-Picot to have truly been effective, Britain and France needed to know the desires of the local populace. Though this idea is debatable, due to the fact Britain reneged on other promises made during the war, how can one negotiate on a subject they do not know is contentious. Therefore, Saeed argues, some fault must fall on the people themselves, an argument he examines through the struggle for an independent Kurdistan.
Saeed raises the question “How did Arabs obtain several independent states from the remains of the Ottoman Empire and the Turks carve out a new country, yet the Kurdish hope for a sovereign state remain unfulfilled?” (Saeed). The answer to this would seem to be that the Arabs were able to effectively communicate and negotiate with the European powers, and while not all of their desires were met, it still gave them a voice in the matter. The Kurds on the other hand, even though they had diplomats talking to Europe, failed to present a united front, “Kurdish leadership during the First World War provides a deep insight into how personal interests trumped greater national interests at a critical period, which impeded the potential development” (Saeed). This means that the clear desires of the Kurdish people were not apparent to the Europeans, and while there is no guarantee Britain would have complied, it would have at least raised the question for debate. Therefore, “History shows that the lack of a coherent Kurdish national discourse combined with disunited, fragmented Kurdish leadership and personal rivalries among Kurdish leaders have been key factors in halting a Kurdish state from developing. These aspects were ultimately more responsible for this failure than the unwillingness of Paris and London” (Saeed). Sykes and Picot are not at fault for the domestic issues enveloping the region, as they were unaware of many issues.
Even though Sykes and Picot were not conventional choices to head such a crucial endeavour, the ensuing disarray is not entirely their fault as some would have you believe. This is because their ideas were not featured in the agreement, but rather those of their nations. Furthermore they didn’t blatantly ignore the desires of the local people, because in some cases as with the Kurds, they were completely unaware because of the greed and power lust of those leaders. Subsequently, while the appointment of Sykes and Picot can be examined and scrutinized, fault does not fall squarely at their feet. In fact, the direct influence the personal opinions held by the two men had on the region is negligible. However, they still remain the figureheads for the calamitous consequences they ultimately played a small role in.